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Introduction
Energy is an essential production factor that fuels economic growth and serves human wellbeing. Along with unprecedented economic growth, world primary energy use has grown enormously since the middle of the 19 th century. The energy crisis of the 1970s and, more recently, the environmental problems associated with economic growth and increasing energy use have made most governments in OECD countries to strive explicitly for sustainable development, aiming to decouple economic growth and environmental pressure. In a more operational sense this implies a need for a simultaneous productivity increase of 'traditional'
input factors, such as labour and capital, and of 'environmental' input factors, such as materials and energy.
Over the last decades, a growth accounting tradition has emerged measuring the contribution of various determinants to output-and productivity growth (see, for example, Kendrick 1961; Denison 1967; Jorgenson and Griliches 1967; Maddison 1991; Jorgenson 1995; Wagner and van Ark 1996; van Ark 1997; Barro 1997 ). This empirical research on productivity growth has focused almost exclusively on labour-, capital-and total factorproductivity growth. Among the main empirical findings are that economic growth depends on a number of interrelated factors such as an increase in the labour force and labour productivity, accumulation of knowledge and capital, institutional factors and -probably most importantly -technological change (see, for example, OECD 2003). More recently, this work has been accompanied by empirical research on energy-productivity or energy-intensity developments and its determinants (see, for example, Jorgenson 1984 Jorgenson , 1986 Howarth et al. 1991; Schipper and Meyers 1992; Rosenberg 1994; Miketa 2001) . Although this literature is rather diverse in focus, broad consensus exists that both technological change and changes in the production structure are among the most important determinants of long-run increases of energy productivity. In this paper we build upon both perspectives in the literature by simultaneously analyzing energy-and labour-productivity developments across 10
Manufacturing sectors and 14 OECD countries, for the period . In doing so, we put emphasis on an examination of the role of technological change in driving productivity growth of the two production factors energy and labour. Hence, we are able to explore to what extent technology-driven improvements of energy-and labour productivity performance contribute to a decoupling of economic growth and environmental pressure at a detailed sectoral level across the most important OECD countries.
For this aim, we constructed a new database to establish a link between economic and energy data at a detailed sectoral level for a range of countries. A brief description of this dataset is given in Section 2. The level of sectoral detail in our dataset allows us to trace back aggregate manufacturing energy-and labour-productivity trends to developments at the level of individual sectors. In Section 3 we document several stylised facts on the levels and trends in manufacturing energy-and labour-productivity performance, examining the role of the different manufacturing subsectors. As noted previously, observed aggregate productivity trends are not directly attributable to technological change in individual sectors, but also the result of changes in the production structure, i.e., of changes in the distribution of production factors among different sectors. The underlying reason is that some sectors produce more value added per unit of input (energy or labour) than others, because some activities require more capital, higher labour skills and/or technology than others. Our data show that across OECD countries, the manufacturing sector is characterised by a very heterogeneous production structure. Hence, understanding technology-driven productivity performance requires an assessment of productivity developments in individual sectors (see also, for example, Dollar and Wolff 1993; Wagner and van Ark 1996; Jorgenson 1984) . In Section 4
we therefore decompose per country the aggregate manufacturing energy-and labour productivity growth into a part due to shifts in the underlying sectoral structure and into a part caused by technology-driven efficiency improvements in individual sectors. In several respects, our decomposition differs from other decomposition studies (e.g., Unander et al. 1999) , most notably by the combination of a relatively high level of sectoral detail with a wide range of countries, a simultaneous exploration of productivity performance along the two dimensions of energy and labour, and a detailed calculation per country of the percentage contribution of each manufacturing sector to structural changes and efficiency improvements at the level of aggregate manufacturing.
Finally, by documenting the relation between energy-and labour-productivity growth rates we touch upon the issue of the direction of technological change. The idea that the nature of technological progress might be factor-augmenting, depending on relative factor prices and substitution possibilities, goes back to Hicks (1932) and received attention in the theoretical and empirical literature on technological change and factor-productivity developments ever since (see, for example, Kennedy 1962; Binswanger 1974a,b; Acemoglu 2002; Ruttan 2001) . Recently, the issue has also been addressed in the context of environmental policy and energy use, examining a price-or product-standard induced bias towards energy-saving technological change (see, for example, Newell et al. 1999; Smulders and de Nooij 2003; Taheri and Stevenson 2002 ). An important hypothesis in this respect is that if all technological efforts are directed towards an increase in labour productivity, energy productivity improvements might slow down because of lack of resources devoted to increasing energy efficiency − and vice versa. In Section 5 we provide some empirical evidence on the existence and development of a potential bias towards either energy-or labour productivity improvements, which might reflect biases of technological change at the level of individual sectors. Section 6 concludes.
Data
The analysis presented in this paper is based on a newly constructed database that merges energy data from the Energy Balances, as they are published by the International Energy Agency (IEA), and economic data from the International Sectoral Database (ISDB) and the Structural Analysis Database (STAN), both published by the OECD. The main idea behind the construction of this database is to establish a link between economic and energy data at a detailed sectoral level. This results in the sector classification as described in Table 1 . We measure energy productivity by gross value added per unit of final energy consumption and labour productivity by gross value added per worker (in full time equivalents). Value added is the net economic output of a sector, measured by the price differential between the price of output and the cost of input and comprises compensation to employees, operating surplus, the consumption of fixed capital and the excess of indirect taxes over subsidies (OECD 1998) . Following the IEA, energy use is defined as final energy consumption in kilo tonnes of oil equivalence (ktoe), 2 with sectoral data excluding transformation losses. Total employment is measured in the full-time equivalent number of persons, including self-employed.
The value-added data have been converted to constant 1990 US$, using 1990 expenditure purchasing power parities (PPP) as given by the OECD. In principle the theoretically most appropriate conversion factors for productivity comparisons at the sectoral level are to be based on a comparison of output prices by industry of origin, rather than on expenditure prices (e.g., van Ark and Pilat 1993) . 3 The main problem in using the production or industry-of-origin approach, however, is the limited availability of producer-price based PPPs, in particular for non-Manufacturing sectors (van Ark 1993). 4 Hence, most studies including cross-country productivity comparisons use expenditure PPPs. Moreover, for an international comparison the main issue is whether there are substantial cross-country differences with respect to the drawbacks of expenditure PPPs as outlined above. We have no a priori reason to presume that these cross-country differences are substantial. Therefore, in this study we use expenditure PPPs, enabling a systematic cross-country analysis of energyand labour-productivity performance at a high level of sectoral detail. Obviously, because of these issues, the results reported in this paper should be interpreted with caution.
In general, it holds for each analysis of productivity developments that the lower the level of aggregation the better, but that an adequate distinction between factor-intensive and factor-extensive sectors is even more important. In this respect, it is to be noted that our 
Stylized Facts
Economic development typically involves a change in the sectoral composition of economies, with the industrialisation process inducing a shift from the Agricultural sector towards Industry, followed by a deindustrialisation phase increasing the importance of the Service sector (e.g., Baumol 1967; Maddison 1991 Maddison , 1999 de Groot 2000) . Moreover, in the OECD countries the Transport sector tends to overtake the Manufacturing sector as the largest consumer of final energy (Schipper and Meyers 1992) . Nevertheless, within the OECD the Manufacturing sector is still responsible for about 40% of total final energy consumption and 25% of total employment (UN 2001) . We start our analysis by presenting several stylised facts on the aforementioned issues, in order to illustrate the possible implications for decoupling economic growth and energy use. For this aim we plot in Figure 1 for each country in our dataset the development over time of the levels of GDP, final energy consumption and total employment in the aggregate manufacturing sector (normalised at 100
in the initial year of the sample).
< Insert Figure 1 around here > From the figure it can be seen that in all countries manufacturing value added has increased while in virtually all countries total manufacturing employment has been declining.
Concerning energy consumption the picture is diverse: in Denmark, the United Kingdom and the USA it has been falling, in Australia, Canada, Finland and Japan it has increased, while in all the other countries the level of final energy use has been more or less constant over time.
Moreover, except for Norway, even in those countries showing increasing total manufacturing energy use, the growth in energy consumption has been outpaced by growth in value added, implying an increase in manufacturing energy productivity. In other words, while delinking of economic growth and energy use in the manufacturing sector is absolute ('strong decoupling') in Denmark, the United Kingdom and the USA, most countries show a pattern of relative delinking ('weak' decoupling).
To compare the development of manufacturing energy-and labour-productivity performance across the different countries, we show in Figure 2 and 3 the aggregate manufacturing energy-and labour-productivity levels over time, for each of the 14 OECD countries in our dataset. Figure 2 shows that in aggregate manufacturing two groups of countries can be identified in terms of observed levels of energy productivity. Denmark, Italy, West-Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom show a high level of energy productivity while the USA, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Finland, Canada and
Norway display a relative low energy-productivity level. 5 Figure 3 , confirms again the wellknown leading position of the USA in terms of labour productivity. It also shows that there is no clear pattern of catching-up by other OECD countries.
< Insert Figures 2 and 3 around here > As previously noted, aggregate trends prevent a good understanding of sectoral dynamics, in particular in case of a high degree of sectoral heterogeneity. Hence, we continue by examining the role of the 10 manufacturing sub-sectors (see Table 1 ) in driving these aggregate developments. To illustrate the structure of the manufacturing sector, we first give a brief overview of their shares in Manufacturing energy consumption, employment and GDP (see Figure 4 ). For the 14 OECD countries included in this study taken together, the sub- In Figure 4 we compare those shares with the shares of total employment and value added. This yields a different picture, with Machinery accounting for the largest share of 5 For the same sample of countries but using energy consumption data from partly different sources, Unander et al. (1999) words, the manufacturing sector is characterised by a substantial degree of heterogeneity concerning the underlying production structure, which underlines the relevance of taking a sectoral approach in examining its development of productivity over time.
Next, in order to see which Manufacturing sectors drive the observed aggregate trends, we provide in Table 2 for all 10 Manufacturing sub-sectors a cross-country comparison of the energy-and labour productivity level relative to the weighted OECD average in 1976, 1982, 1990 and 1997. 9 The table reveals that the energy-productivity level in Germany and Japan lies above the OECD average in most Manufacturing sectors, while the opposite is true for a country like Norway. Concerning labour productivity, Table 2 again confirms the wellknown leading position of the USA for most manufacturing sectors. Exceptions, however, are
Non-Ferrous Metals and Non-Metallic Minerals, where the USA is lagging behind some other countries. For most countries, however, the table shows a diverse picture with considerable cross-sector variation in relative productivity performance. For example, the high energy-productivity level in Denmark, as shown in Figure 2 , is due to an extremely high energy-productivity level in Chemicals and Paper, while its energy-productivity level in Food is relatively low. The Netherlands are characterised by a relatively low level of energy productivity in Chemicals, but a relatively high energy-productivity level in Paper and Wood.
Moreover, it shows a high labour-productivity level in Non-Ferrous Metals, while the converse holds for Transport Equipment. A few other remarkable facts are: Finland, Norway and Sweden have low levels of energy productivity in Paper and Wood; the United Kingdom has a relatively high level of energy productivity in Chemicals, Iron and Steel and Paper, while this is relatively low in Machinery; and Italy has a very high level of energy productivity in Wood.
< Insert Table 2 around here > Looking at the standard deviation of the log of relative energy productivity in Table 2 leads to the conclusion that the cross-country differences in energy productivity are substantially larger than cross-country differences in labour productivity. Moreover, we find cross-country differences in labour-productivity performance to be slightly decreasing. Cross-country dispersion of energy productivity is increasing in the energy-intensive sectors Chemicals, Iron and Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals, while it is (more or less) constant in Chemicals,
Paper and Wood and decreasing in the other sectors. All this points to considerable country specific dynamics concerning the use of energy and labour in manufacturing production.
To see what this implies for delinking economic growth and energy use at the sectoral level, we summarize in Figure 5 per country the total percentage change of the level of GDP, final energy use and total employment over roughly the period 1970-1997. 
Decomposing productivity growth rates
As we have argued in section 1, overall productivity performance not only results from technology-driven productivity performance in individual sectors, but also from the distribution of production factors among sectors. Therefore, in this section we will correct trends in aggregate energy-and labour-productivity performance for the impact of shifts in sectoral energy-and employment shares, to get a better view on the role of sector-specific technology-driven productivity improvements in driving aggregate productivity growth.
We do so by using a decomposition-or shift-share analysis, which is based on the following definitions of, respectively, aggregate energy productivity and labour productivity:
with Y t , E t and L t being, respectively, GDP, final energy consumption and total employment, and the subscript i denoting the sub-sector. So, equation (1) says that aggregate energy productivity is the sum of the energy productivity of each sub-sector (the first term at RHS) multiplied by the energy share of each sub-sector (the second term at RHS). Equation (2) defines the same relationship in terms of labour productivity. Building upon equations (1) and (2), we decompose aggregate energy-and labour-productivity growth into a structural effect and an efficiency effect. The structural effect is obtained by calculating aggregate energyand labour-productivity growth insofar as it is caused by shifts in sectoral energy-and employment shares (the second term at RHS), keeping the levels of energy-and labourproductivity performance for each individual sub-sector (the first term at RHS) constant. Vice versa, the efficiency effect is obtained by calculating aggregate energy-and labourproductivity growth insofar as it is caused by changes in the energy-and labour-productivity performance within each individual sub-sector, keeping the sectoral energy-and employment shares constant. Hence, the structural effect indicates the effect of changes in the structure of production on aggregate productivity growth while the efficiency effect points to the role of technology-driven efficiency improvements.
Many studies have measured the relative contribution of structural and technological change to aggregate productivity growth, using so-called index number decomposition or shift-share analysis. The studies differ from each other in several dimensions, including the number of sectors and countries included, the methodology (Laspyeres, Paasche, Divisia, etc.), the area of application (TFP, capital, labour, energy), the type of indicator (quantity, intensity, productivity or elasticity) and the type of analysis (time-series or period-wise). For a lucid exposition of the methodology and a survey of studies on (total factor) productivity we refer to Syrquin (1984) and Balk (2001) , as well as to Ang (1995a Ang ( , 1995b Ang ( , 1999 and Ang and Zhang (2000) for applications in the context of energy studies.
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In this study we have chosen for time-series analysis, the additive technique and the socalled Refined Divisia Method (RDM). We have chosen to use the RDM because this method gives, contrary to the other methods, perfect decomposition irrespective of the pattern exhibited by the data and leaving no residual term. Moreover, this method has the advantage that it can handle the value zero in the data set effectively, while the other methods cannot.
We have chosen to use the additive technique because we are interested in decomposing the absolute change in energy-and labour productivity, rather than a relative change. The main 11 For early applications of this methodology to measure the impact of technological change and changes in labour and/or capital shares on aggregate (total factor productivity) growth see, for example, Maddison (1952) and Massell (1961) . For recent applications, including cross-country comparisons, see Dollar and Wolff (1993) , and Fagerberg (2000) . Cross-country decomposition analyses of energy use can be found, for example, in Greening et al. (1997) , Howarth et al. (1991) , Schipper and Meyers (1992) , Park et al. (1993) , Eichhammer and Mannsbart (1997) and Unander et al. (1999) . value added of our study lies in a simultaneous exploration of productivity performance along the two dimensions of energy and labour for 14 OECD countries over about 25 years.
Moreover, compared to most other studies our analysis comprises a relatively high level of sectoral detail for a relatively large number of countries, in particular in terms of energyproductivity developments. As a result, the changes in technology-driven productivity performance at the level of individual sectors reported here are relatively well specified and informative. Furthermore, our data set enables us to apply a time-series approach whereas most cross-country studies conduct a period-wise approach, using only data for the first and the last year of a specified time period. Compared to a period-wise approach, a time-series approach yields more insight into energy-productivity development over subsequent years and, moreover, the decomposition results are less sensitive to the exact functional form used and to the values in the initial-and final year.
In Figures 6 and 7 we present the results of the decomposition of the aggregate manufacturing energy-and labour productivity growth rates into a structural effect and an efficiency effect.
12 It is to be noted that one has to be careful with comparing the results between countries due to the different time periods used (because of data availability).
< Insert Figures 6 and 7 around here > Figure 6 shows that in all 12 OECD countries energy-efficiency improvements are the main driving force behind aggregate manufacturing energy-productivity growth, although in most countries there is also a substantial effect from shifts in sectoral energy shares on aggregate manufacturing energy-productivity growth. This structural effect is mixed: it is positive in Belgium (41%), Denmark (11%), France (47%), West-Germany (20%), Italy (37%), Japan (33%) and the USA (35%), indicating a shift towards a less energy-intensive Manufacturing structure, while it is negative in Finland (-50%), the Netherlands (-30%), Norway (-960%) and Sweden (-12%), indicating a shift towards a more energy-intensive manufacturing structure. In Norway the large structural change even dominates the energy-efficiency improvements.
This overall picture accords well with other cross-country studies decomposing manufacturing energy use in OECD countries (Greening et al. 1997; Howarth et al. 1991; Eichhammer and Mannsbart 1997; Unander et al. 1999) , although our structural effects in Finland, France and Italy are relatively high as compared to these studies. This might well be due to differences in data, period and decomposition method between the other studies and ours. 13 Concerning labour-productivity growth, Figure 7 shows that in all 12 OECD countries the effect of shifts in sectoral employment shares on aggregate Manufacturing labourproductivity growth is positive, but also very small; almost all aggregate Manufacturing labour-productivity growth is to be explained from labour productivity improvements in individual sectors. This result confirms what has been known from empirical labourproductivity analyses for the Manufacturing sector (see, for example, Dollar and Wolff 1993 and Fagerberg 2000) . Finally, except for Denmark and the USA, the average manufacturing labour-productivity growth is higher than manufacturing energy-productivity growth. We calculated that for the 12 OECD countries taken together the weighted average annual growth rates of Manufacturing energy-and labour productivity are, respectively, 2.25% and 2.69%, while they drop to, respectively, 1.57% and 2.53% after being corrected for the impact of structural changes.
To see which sectors are responsible for these aggregate results, we split the percentage contribution of the total efficiency effect and the total structural effect to the aggregate productivity growth rates, as presented in Figures 6 and 7 respectively, into the percentage contribution of individual sub-sectors. The results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. < Insert Table 3 around here > From Table 3 it can be concluded that, except for France, the aggregate manufacturing energy-productivity improvements are to a large extent realised within the Machinery sector, followed by Chemicals. 14 Looking into the sources of structural changes yields a more diverse picture. In Belgium, the substantial positive structural effect on aggregate manufacturing energy-productivity growth is mainly caused by a shift of the energy share 14 Note that in France, Norway and in particular in the Netherlands a substantial part of the efficiency improvement is realised within the sector Non-Specified Industry (NSI). The same holds for structural changes in Italy, Norway and, again particularly, in the Netherlands. NSI contains rubber (355) and plastic products (not classified elsewhere) (356), furniture (332) and professional, scientific, measuring and controlling equipment (not classified elsewhere), photographic and optical goods (385). Furthermore, it contains energy consumption for which no sectoral breakdown can be given. Whereas NSI is rather unimportant in most countries with an average share of 2% of total energy consumption, in the countries mentioned before the share of NSI in Manufacturing GDP is on average about 12%. In sum, one should read the results with caution since an efficiency improvement and a changing energy share in NSI is partly due to developments in the above mentioned sectors (ISIC 355, 356, 332 and 385) and might be partly due to data inaccuracy. West Germany, Japan and the USA, combine an increasing energy share in the energyintensive Chemical sector with an overall positive structural effect while the Netherlands combine a decreasing energy share in Chemicals with an overall negative structural effect. A similar story is true for the Paper sector: Belgium and France combine a substantial increase in energy share in the energy-intensive sector Paper with an overall positive structural effect, while the opposite is true for the Netherlands, which realises an overall negative structural effect in spite of a shift away from Paper. Of course, these counter-examples can be explained from the simple fact that shifts in energy shares in one sector are sufficiently compensated by shifts in other sectors. Moreover, they might be due to data limitations, partly because in some countries (in particular Italy and the Netherlands) a significant role is played by Non-Specified Industry and partly because of the fact that the 2-and 3-digit sector definitions that were used hide heterogeneity in production structure at the 4-digit level.
15 15 Recall that the Chemicals sector is built up from the energy-intensive sub-sector Industrial Chemicals (ISIC 351) and the energy-extensive sub-sector Other Chemical Products (ISIC 352). Similarly, the Paper sector is built up from the energy-intensive Paper and Pulp sector (ISIC 341) and the energy-extensive Printing sector (ISIC 342. Hence, the observed shifts in energy shares might be characterised as intra-sectoral shifts. For example, it is known that in the Netherlands the share of Industrial Chemicals in the Chemical industry has been substantially reduced over time (CPB 2000: 63-68) . As noted before, until consistent and internationally comparable energy and economic data become available for a more detailed breakdown of these sectors, the decomposition results should be interpreted with caution.
Finally, In Table 4 we present a similar breakdown of the total structural-and efficiency effect as in Table 3 , but now for labour productivity.
< Insert Table 4 around here > Table 4 shows that, as for energy productivity, the aggregate manufacturing labourproductivity improvements are to a large extent realised within the Machinery sector.
Moreover, the 
Sectoral biases in productivity growth rates
As a final step in our analysis, in this section we take a closer look at the relation between growth rates of energy-and labour productivity. For this aim we calculated for each manufacturing sector the average annual growth rates of energy-and labour productivity per country for the period 1970-1997. They are presented in Figure 8 together with 2 regression lines through the origin, estimating the relationship between energy-and labour-productivity growth rates for, respectively, the periods 1970-1982 and 1982-1997. 16 16 Note that the exact period differs for each country due to data restrictions. We refer to Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A for an overview of the periods used per country, the sectoral growth rates per country (the same as in Figure 8 , but then in tabular format) as well as the weighted average sectoral growth rates for the sum of the OECD countries included in this study.
< Insert Figure 8 around here >
This leads to the following three conclusions. First, overall a positive correlation exists between energy-and labour productivity growth rates, suggesting energy-and labourproductivity growth to be complements rather than substitutes. There are, however, a few exceptions. In several sectors, most notable in Transport Equipment, and Paper and Wood, several countries combine a positive labour-productivity growth rate with a negative growth rate in energy productivity. Second, labour-productivity growth is in general higher than energy-productivity growth, suggesting the existence of a bias towards labour-augmenting technological change. Third, over time, this bias towards labour-productivity growth is decreasing in all manufacturing sectors except for Paper: in this sector the regression line for the period 1982-1997 is steeper than those for the period 1970-1982. This result is in contrast with the increasing bias towards labour-productivity growth, which we found at the level of aggregate manufacturing and, hence, underlines the relevance of productivity analysis at a disaggregated level.
The overall positive relationship between energy-and labour-productivity growth rates may suggest that technological change is embodied in new capital goods which perform better than older capital goods in multiple dimensions, including a better performance in terms of both labour-and energy productivity. This hypothesis assumes that knowledge is more or less a public good as a result of which the most recent capital goods embody state-ofthe art technology in different dimensions. If this is true, firms and sectors investing in new capital goods in order to expand or replace existing production facilities or to increase labour productivity, invest at the same time in energy-saving technological change. However, more precise conclusions concerning these issues require a better insight in the nature of technological change through microeconomic research (see, for example, Newell et al. 1999) , which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Conclusions
Technological change plays a crucial role in decoupling economic growth and environmental pressure. Technology-driven productivity growth is an important source of economic growth and plays an important role in realising this decoupling, for example, through increasing energy productivity. Against this background, we empirically examined in this paper the energy-and labour-productivity performance in 14 OECD over the last decades, covering the period 1970-1997 and distinguishing 10 manufacturing sectors. A principal aim of this paper was to trace back aggregate manufacturing productivity developments to developments at the level of these manufacturing subsectors.
At the level of aggregate manufacturing we found that in all OECD countries value added has increased while in virtually all countries total manufacturing employment has been declining, implying increasing labour productivity. Our data confirm the well-known leading position of the USA in terms of labour productivity, while there is no clear pattern of catching-up by other OECD countries. With respect to manufacturing final energy consumption the picture is diverse, with energy use having increased in some countries while it has been falling in others. Nevertheless, except for Norway, in all studied OECD countries aggregate manufacturing energy productivity has increased over time (due to the relatively high growth in value added). Moreover, cross-country differences in energy productivity are found to be substantially larger than cross-country differences in labour productivity.
Delinking of economic growth and energy use was shown to be relative ('weak' decoupling) in most OECD countries, while Denmark, the United Kingdom and the USA show a pattern of absolute delinking ('strong decoupling'). These latter three countries were Paper.
An exploration of the relationship between energy-and labour-productivity growth rates has shown that this relationship, with some exceptions, is positive in most sectors, suggesting energy-and labour-productivity growth to be complements rather than substitutes.
Furthermore, we found labour-productivity growth rates in general to be substantially higher than energy-productivity growth while this bias towards labour-productivity growth increased in aggregate Manufacturing, but decreased in most manufacturing sectors. The latter result underlines the relevance of a sectoral approach in analysing issues concerning factor productivity and decoupling of economic growth and energy use.
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